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Perhaps no legal principle illustrates the use of Fourteenth Amendment equal 
protection jurisprudence more poignantly than the relatively obscure cy pres 
doctrine.  The ancient doctrine which allowed both courts and the Crown in England 
to change trust purposes when the original trust purposes proved no longer viable 
was adopted belatedly, sporadically and partially by jurisdictions in the United 
States.2  Although use of the doctrine was meager in the 19th century,3 use increased 
                                                                
1Associate Professor of Law, Southern New England School of Law, North Dartmouth, 
Massachusetts; B.A., Southern Methodist University, Dallas, Texas; J.D., University of 
Arkansas School of Law; M.A., Ph.D., History, University of Arkansas.  The author wishes to 
acknowledge the late Professor George W. Keeton (1902-1989), Gray’s Inn, for sparking 
interest in the complex Law of Trusts and the dynamic world of legal history. 
2Justice Taney, concurring in William Fontain, Administrator of Frederick Kohne v. 
William Ravenel, 58 U.S. 369 (Mem.), 17 How. 369, 15 L.Ed. 80 (1854), noted the differences 
of opinion in the few Supreme Court cases that had considered whether the doctrine had been 
adopted as part of the common law.  Taney's conclusion highlights the difficulty the early 
courts had with the question of jurisdiction and of reception relating to the doctrine of cy pres, 
"I think I can safely conclude that the power exercised by the English court of chancery 'in 
enforcing donations to charitable uses,' is not a part of its jurisdiction as a court of equity, but 
a prerogative power exercised by that court."  Id. at 392-94.  The majority denied the 
application of cy pres, noting, "The chancery powers are of comparatively recent 
establishment in the State of Pennsylvania, and it does not appear that the cy pres power is 
given, and in the exercise of jurisdiction it seems to be disclaimed."  Id. at 389. 
3In 1867, the Massachusetts court noted the refusal to adopt the doctrine by Maryland, 
Virginia, North Carolina, New York, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Connecticut and Illinois; 
its restricted acceptance in Kentucky; its relative acceptance in Vermont, Maine, New 
Hampshire, Georgia and Ohio; and contrasted this record with the doctrine's acceptance in 
Massachusetts.  Jackson v. Phillips, 96 Mass (14 Allen) 539, 588-91 (1867).  Judge Gray 
speaking for the Supreme Judicial Court explained the reception in Massachusetts, "The 
narrow doctrines which have prevailed in some states upon this subject are inconsistent with 
the established law of this commonwealth.  Our ancestors brought with them from England the 
elements of the law of charitable uses, and, although the form of proceeding by commission 
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after the turn of the century and expanded dramatically after World War II.4   Used 
as a means to attack discriminatory trust purposes, the doctrine elicited application of 
the state action concept in the fifties by the Supreme Court.5  Proposals for reform of 
cy pres also began in the fifties6 and continue today, reflecting the current debate 
over affirmative action.  Interestingly, the proposals for reform correspond to reform 
                                                          
under the St. of 43 Eliz. has never prevailed in Massachusetts, that statute, in substance and 
principle, has always been considered as part of our common law."  Id. at 591.  The court 
applied cy pres to the bequest by Francis Jackson to Wendell Phillips and others in trust for 
the emancipation of slaves, rendered impossible by the passage of the Thirteenth Amendment, 
and ordered that the funds be paid over to the Freedmen's Union Commission, to be used for 
the education of the "late slaves."  Id. at 599.  The court, however, refused to apply the 
doctrine to save the bequest to Wendell Phillips et al "to secure the passage of laws granting 
women, whether married or unmarried, the right to vote, to hold office, manage, and devise 
property; and all other civil rights enjoyed by men; . . . ."  Id. at 542 (deeming such purposes 
not to be charitable).  The court commented, citing, inter alia, Habershon v. Vardon, 4 De Gex 
& Sm 467, "Gifts for purposes prohibited by or opposed to the existing laws cannot be upheld 
as charitable, even if for objects which would otherwise be deemed such."  Id. at 555.  
4George Gleason Bogert summarizes the situation before and after 1943.  See George 
Gleason Bogert, Proposed Legislation Regarding State Supervision of Charities, 54 MICH. L. 
REV. 633 (1954).  Generally before 1943, "there was little statutory law in the United States 
concerning the supervision and enforcement of charitable trusts."  Id.  Bogert noted that 
"[b]eginning in 1943 a new trend appeared in American statute law with respect to state 
supervision of charitable trusts."  Id.  New Hampshire led the way with Rhode Island, Ohio, 
South Carolina, and Texas following, and with the states of Indiana, California, New York, 
Florida and Vermont showing interest.  The National Conference of Commissioners on 
Uniform State Laws appointed in 1951 a committee to draft the Uniform Supervision of 
Charitable Trusts Act and directed that committee to redraft the act for presentation at the 
1954 annual meeting.  Id. at 649-50.  See also Bogert's suggestions for a model or uniform act.  
Id. at 652-58.  In 1954, both the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State 
Laws and the House of Delegates of the American Bar Association approved the Uniform 
Supervision of Trustees for Charitable Purposes Act.  Only California, Illinois, Michigan and 
Oregon had adopted the Act when, in 1990, the Commission denominated it a model act, 
reasoning that it had really been treated by the states in that capacity.  See Uniform Laws 
Annotated, v. 7B. 
5Pennsylvania v. Board of Directors of City Trusts of City of Philadelphia 353 U.S. 230 
(1957), wherein the Supreme Court reversed a decision of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania 
which allowed the Board of Directors of City Trusts of the City of Philadelphia to refuse to 
admit Negroes to a "college" established for poor white males by Stephen Girard's 
testamentary trust in 1831.  The court found the Board's action to be state action prohibited by 
the Fourteenth Amendment, citing Brown v. Board of Education 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Evans 
v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966), wherein the Supreme Court held that a park established in 
1911 in Macon, Georgia, by Senator Augustus O. Bacon in a  testamentary trust for whites 
only could no longer be operated as a segregated facility, finding such discrimination violated 
the Fourteenth Amendment equal protection clause; Evans v. Abney 396 U.S. 435 (1970), 
wherein the Supreme Court allowed to stand the reversion of the trust assets and the 
subsequent closing of the park in Macon, Georgia, under the rationale that the cy pres doctrine 
could not be applied in the absence of general charitable intent. 
6See Bogert, supra note 4.  See also Stuart M. Nelkin, Cy Pres and the Fourteenth 
Amendment: A Discriminating Look at Very Private Schools and Not So Charitable Trusts, 56 
GEO. L. J. 272 (1967) . 
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studies commissioned in England.7  In Part I, the author illustrates how the United 
States jurisdictions differ from England in the requirement for charitable intent.  
Earlier cases reveal the United States, unlike England, has resisted relaxation of the 
requirement.  In Part II, the author uses the Restatement of Trusts to demonstrate 
further how the jurisdictions had developed differently at the mid-twentieth century 
point. 
In Part III, the author reports on the significant reforms in England and the 
corresponding, though halting, movement toward reform in the United States 
jurisdictions.  In Part IV, the author describes the specific reform proposals in the 
United States proliferating since 1943.  Finally, the author concludes that relaxation 
of cy pres doctrinal requirements is realized best by modest legislation and effective 
drafting. 
I.  THE CY PRES DOCTRINE IN THE UNITED STATES AND ENGLAND 
In the law of charities, the doctrine of cy-pres was formulated to effectuate a trust 
which might otherwise fail.  Restatement (Second) of Trusts8 defines the doctrine in 
this way: 
If property is given in trust to be applied to a particular charitable purpose, 
and it is, or becomes, impossible or impracticable or illegal to carry out 
the particular purpose, and if the settlor manifested a more general 
intention to devote the property to charitable purposes, the trust will not 
fail, but the Court will direct the application of the property to some 
charitable purpose which falls within the general charitable intention of 
the settlor. 
The doctrine has been described as one of "approximation."9  In providing an 
alternative charitable purpose, the Courts have read cy pres to mean "as near as 
possible" to the declared object.10  The Restatement definition expresses the 
American version of the doctrine which differs from English law by requiring that 
general charitable intent always be shown before a substitute purpose is applied.  
Attempts to formulate a single definition for the cy pres doctrine will prove 
impossible because jurisdictional approaches vary as does the historical development 
within each jurisdiction, but the Restatement definition expresses the traditional 
common law. 
                                                                
7Parliament repealed the Charitable Trust Acts enacted from 1853 and replaced them with 
the Charities Act of 1960, pursuant to the report of The Nathan Committee.  See GEORGE W. 
KEETON & LIONEL ASTOR SHERIDAN, THE MODERN LAW OF CHARITIES, (2d ed. 1971).  The 
Report of the Committee on the Law and Practice Relating to charitable trusts known as The 
Nathan Report was presented by the Prime Minister to Parliament in 1952.  A subsequent 
report published in 1987, known as the Woodfield Report, resulted from a commission by the 
British Home Secretary and the Economic Secretary to the Treasury of Sir Philip Woodfield to 
review the work of the Commissioners under the 1960 act.  The latter report suggested that 
some relaxation of the cy pres doctrine might be advisable.  See fuller discussion infra.  
8RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 399 (1958). 
9In re Kensington Hospital for Women, A. 2d. 154 (Pa. 1948). 
10KEETON & SHERIDAN, supra note 7, at 135. 
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The English use of the doctrine contrasts sharply with its practice in the United 
States.  The English have applied the cy pres doctrine in cases where the donor, 
testator, or settlor has expressed a general charitable intention and, in other instances, 
where no general charitable intention has been manifested.  Professors George W. 
Keeton and L. A. Sheridan summarized the requirement for a general charitable 
intent in English Law: 
A general charitable intent must be shown: 
1. Where the purpose indicated by the testator is impossible or illegal; 
2. Where the purpose has never existed; 
3. Where the object has existed but ceases to exist before the  testator's 
death. 
 
A general charitable intent need not be shown: 
1. Where the purpose or institution ceases to exist after the gift has taken 
effect. 
2. Where a charity comes to an end because the object for which it was 
established has ceased to exist, or has come to an end for some other 
reason; 
3. Where the machinery for the application of the gift fails;  
4. Where, after providing for the particular object, there is a surplus of 
charitable funds.11 
Professors L. A. Sheridan and V. T. H. Delany, emphasizing this difference, 
pointed out that "except in most parts of the United States, the absence of a general 
charitable intent is not fatal to a cy-pres application."12 They defined general 
charitable intent as an intent to benefit any or a type of charity, however narrow or 
unlimited, which is wide enough to include the stated (impossible) purpose.13  To 
find general charitable intent, the terms of the gift will be taken into account as will 
the place of the gift in the instrument, whether the gift is surrounded by other 
charitable gifts, or if the disposition is in favour of an organization which has never 
existed.14  All pertinent facts relating to the formation of the gift may be considered 
by the court.15  The rationale behind the requirement of general intent is grounded in 
the historical insistence in trust law that courts respect trustor intent and in the 
reluctance of courts to re-write the trust instrument. 
Cases from the early 1900's illustrate the traditional approach to cy pres used in 
the United States.  In the 1929 case, Rhode Island Hospital Trust Company v. 
Williams,16 the testatrix made a bequest to the Bristol Cottage Hospital which was in 
                                                                
11Id. at 134-35; see also GEORGE W. KEETON, THE LAW OF TRUSTS 171 (9 ed. 1971). 
12LIONEL ASTOR SHERIDAN & VINCENT THOMAS HYGINUS DELANY, THE CY-PRES 
DOCTRINE, 33 (1st ed. 1959). 
13Id. at 36. 
14For a thorough discussion of charitable intent, see Mary Kay Lundwall, Inconsistency 
and Uncertainty in the Charitable Purposes Doctrine, 42 WAYNE L. REV. 1341, 1348-51 
(1995). 
15See Vanessa Laird, Phantom Selves:  The Search for a General Charitable Intent in the 
Application of the Cy Pres Doctrine, 40 STAN. L. REV. 973 (1988).  
16148 A. 189 (R.I. 1929). 
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existence when the will was executed, but ceased to exist before the death of the 
testatrix.  Judge Barrow described the task before the court, "The difficult problem in 
this type of case       is to ascertain whether the charitable intention of the testatrix 
was specific only, or if the dominant intent was of a general charitable nature so that 
it may be made effective cy-pres."17 The court found that the testatrix had a 
"dominant purpose to devote the residue of her estate to general charities of the type 
represented" by its successor, and applied the gift cy pres.18 
In construing the will to find the testatrix's intent, the Rhode Island Supreme 
Court emphasized the fact that other charities were named together in the residuary 
clause and the fact that the Bristol Cottage Hospital had been an active charity at the 
time the testatrix executed her will.  These facts were sufficient to allow the court to 
find an interest in the general charitable project of a cottage hospital and to order the 
charitable funds accordingly. 
In the 1920 case, Bancroft v. Maine State Sanitorium Association,19 the Maine 
court noted:  “The general principle running through all the cases is that, in order to 
apply the cy-pres doctrine, there must be two pre-requisites:  first, a failure of the 
specific object; and, second, a general charitable intent disclosed in the instrument 
creating the trust.”20 
The gift in Bancroft failed because the court could not find a general charitable 
intent.  The object of the gift was a charitable tuberculosis sanitorium which had 
been turned over to the State.  Although the instrument provided for forfeiture under 
certain conditions with a gift over to specified persons, the fact that the association to 
whom the gift was made ceased to hold the sanitorium was not within the scope of 
the forfeiture clause.  The court, finding no general charitable intention, ruled that 
the trust should fail. 
A general charitable intent is consistently required throughout the states in which 
the doctrine had been judicially adopted, and in most of the states statutorily 
adopting cy pres.21 However, a recent Connecticut case has been criticized as 
precedent for completely doing away with the requirement of testator intent under 
the Connecticut version of the Uniform Management of Institutional Funds Act.22  
                                                                
17Id. at 190. 
18Id. at 192. 
19109 A. 585 (Me. 1920). 
20Id. at 592. 
21See generally 4A Austin Wakeman Scott & William Franklin Fratcher, The Law of 
Trusts § 399, 476, (4th ed. 1989). 
22Andrew C. Kruger, Are Charitable Trusts and the Doctrine of Cy Pres Alive After Yale 
University v. Blumenthal? 8 CONN. PROB. L.J. 241 (1994) (discussing the effect of the 
Connecticut Uniform Management of Institutional Funds Act on the doctrine of cy pres).  
Kruger notes that some thirty-six states have adopted similar statutes patterned on the Uniform 
Management of Institutional Funds Act which may give the holding "national implications 
regarding a limitation on a testator's 'deadhand' control."  Id. at 242.  When Thomas F. 
Smallman died in 1928, he left $ 225,000.00 in trust, life income to his wife with remainder at 
her death to Yale College for construction of a sick poor wing at the Yale Medical School.  
The funds in 1987 at the death of Jane Smallman were insufficient to construct such a wing 
and Yale sought and received permission from the Connecticut Supreme Court to use the 
funds to benefit the medical school as a part of the school's institutional fund.  The court did 
5Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1998
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Only Pennsylvania has legislation which eliminates the requirement of finding 
general charitable intent before applying cy pres,23 although  Massachusetts has 
liberally extended the cy pres doctrine by creating a statutory presumption of general 
charitable intent "unless otherwise provided in a written instrument of gift."24 
Courts in England do not invariably require both failure and general charitable 
intent before applying the doctrine. The doctrine in theory requires an initial finding 
that the specific object of the trust fail.  The failure may result from an impossibility, 
impracticability or illegality, and the facts of each case determine whether the 
purpose fails.  English decisions distinquish between initial impossibility and 
supervening or subsequent impossibility when requiring a general intent.25 
In the 1923 case of Carlisle County v. Norris,26 the Kentucky Court of Appeals 
refused to apply the doctrine.  Norris conveyed property outright to be held in trust 
as a public burial ground.  In addition to the initial conveyance of thirty acres of 
land, he conveyed an additional tract at a later date and, at another time, deposited 
five thousand dollars, income and profit to be used by the trustees for improving the 
property.  At yet a later date, he placed another five thousand dollars with the 
trustees for the same purpose.  After ten years had passed with no sales of cemetery 
lots, Norris brought an action to recover the assets, alleging that the trust purpose had 
failed because of the public's refusal to accept the grounds.  The court did not 
examine the question of general charitable intent, but emphasized the impossiblity of 
obtaining the object of the trust.  The court invoked public policy to find that the 
funds should not be allowed to remain dormant, ruled that the trust had terminated, 
and returned the trust funds to the donor.27 
The English courts would not follow the result in the Norris case.  In cases of 
subsequent impossibility, two possible resolutions can be made by the English 
courts.  A resulting trust may be declared or the application of the funds may be 
applied cy pres.28  Because impossibility is determined at the time the gift is made, 
this case should be considered a case of subsequent impossibility.  The conveyance 
in Norris, however, was unconditional and was, therefore, an "out-and-out" gift.29  In 
England, it is well settled that upon a supervening impossibility, an out-and-out gift 
                                                          
not reach the question of intent.  Although Yale worked out an agreement with the Conneticut 
Attorney General which recited "approximation" with the donor's intent, it did so without 
court direction.  The precedent "could be interpreted as Yale apparently initially sought, to 
remove consideration of testator intent from a charitable gift."  Id. at 248.  
2320 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6110 (a) (West 1996). 
24MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 12, § 8K, as inserted by Laws 1974, c.562.  The statutes also 
provide that persons who might stand to take from the deceased's trust need not be noticed 
when a petition for cy pres is filed, except in certain cases.  See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 
214, § 10B, as inserted by Laws 1974, c.562. 
25See KEETON & SHERIDAN, supra note 7, at 145-55; see also Lionel Astor Sheridan, 
Cy-pres in the Sixties:  Judicial Activity, 6 ALBERTA L. REV. 16, 23 (1968). 
26254 S.W. 1044 (Ky. 1923), 
27Id. at 1046. 
28KEETON & SHERIDAN, supra note 7, at 155. 
29SHERIDAN & DELANY, supra note 12, at 102. 
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is applied cy-pres,30 and in cases of initial impossibility of an out-and-out gift, the 
majority of the English courts apply cy pres.31  In trusts failing after the charitable 
object has attached, the courts do not require a general charitable intent before 
applying cy pres.32  The result would apparently be the same in cases involving trusts 
established by an out-and-out gift whose purpose fails either initially or 
subsequently.  These rules indicate that an English court would decide the Norris 
case differently, whether the impossibility is construed as initial or supervening, 
emphasizing the character of the gift as an out-and-out gift, rather than the 
requirement of general charitable intent.33 
II.  COMPARISON USING THE RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS 
The Restatement (Second) of Trusts appeared in 1957, replacing the 1935 
version.  As an expression of the then current common law of trusts, the Restatement 
allows an intelligible comparison between the use of cy pres in the United States and 
in England and helps to clarify some differences between the jurisdictions.  It is clear 
from the Restatement (Second) of Trusts34 that courts in the United States emphasize 
the requirement of a general charitable intention regardless of whether the failure is 
considered to be initial or subsequent.  The courts more readily apply the cy pres 
doctrine when the particular purpose "fails at some time after the creation of the trust 
than       when the particular purpose fails at the outset" because "it is easier to find a 
more charitable intention of the settlor."35 
The Restatement and the English courts treat the application of surplus funds 
differently although a surplus has been defined as "after all, nothing but the most 
frequent instance of impossibility (usually supervening, occasionally initial). . . ."36  
Under the Restatement: 
                                                                
30Id. 
31In Beggs v. Kirkpatrick V.R. 764, 767 (1961), Justice Adam said "it appears that without 
there being any general charitable intention, a gift made solely for a particular charitable 
purpose although it has failed ab initio, will be administered cy-pres if the gift was an 
out-and-out gift  -- the donor having abandoned all interest in it."  Sheridan, supra note 25, at 
24. 
32See Sheridan, supra note 25, at 24-26. 
33The English courts would also have avoided the reversion of the park in Macon, Georgia 
to the heirs of Senator Augustus O. Bacon.  Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S. 435 (1970).  The trust 
provided a life estate for Bacon's daughters and wife with a remainder to the city of Macon for 
the operation of a segregated park.  In his dissent, Justice Douglas stressed that Bacon left "all 
remainders and reversions and every estate in the same of whatsoever kind" to Macon. Id. at 
448.  In dissent, Justice Brennan also noted that Macon bought the life interests from the life 
tenants in 1920. Id. at 451.  These facts, although argued by the dissenters to establish state 
action, also unmistakenly imply that Bacon's gift was an out-and-out gift, to which the English 
courts would have applied cy pres.   
34RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 399 cmt. i (1959). 
35But see SHERIDAN & DELANY, supra note 12, at 104-07; Sheridan, supra note 25 at 26, 
where the author points out that it is particularly easy to prove general charitable intent when a 
testator has given property to a named institution which never existed. 
36SHERIDAN & DELANY, supra note 12, at 115-16. 
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If property is given upon trust to be applied to a particular charitable 
purpose, and the purpose is fully accomplished without exhausting the 
trust property, and if the settlor manifested a more general intention to 
devote the whole of the trust property to charitable purposes, there will 
not be a resulting trust of the surplus but the court will direct the 
application of the surplus to some charitable purpose which falls within 
the general charitable intention of the settlor.37 
Comments to the Restatement make clear that a general charitable intention is 
required to apply the surplus funds cy pres.  The English judges, however, "speak 
with discordant voices as to any requirement of intention."38  The Restatement39 
indicates that money bequeathed to the completion and publication of a dictionary 
which is over and above the amount required shall be applied to a resulting trust.  
The rule directly conflicts with the English decision in In re King.40  Money 
specifically designated for the installation and maintenance of a stained glass 
memorial window in a Church at Urchester resulted in a surplus which the courts 
applied cy pres for the installation of similar windows in the church.41  No general 
charitable intention was shown or required by the court for the application of cy 
pres.42 
The Restatement  notes one exception to the requirement.  In cases where 
property is given to a charitable corporation to be applied to one of the purposes of 
the corporation and there is a surplus, the court may apply the surplus cy pres to the 
other charitable purposes of the corporation unless the settlor has specifically 
provided for the surplus in the instrument.43 
An out-and-out gift as a charitable subscription will generally be enforced in 
England, regardless of intent.  This principle was followed by Justice Danckwerts in 
In re Wokingham Fire Brigade Trusts.44  Subscriptions were taken to maintain the 
Wokingham Fire Brigade which was later transferred to the National Fire Service, "I 
think that the subscribers intended to part with all interest in the subscriptions when 
they made them for the benefit of this public purpose.  [I]t is not necessary to 
consider whether there was any general charitable intention and the trust should be 
modified by means of a cy-pres application."45 This approach differs from the 
Restatement which provides: 
                                                                
37RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 400 (1959). 
38KEETON & SHERIDAN, supra note 7, at 159.  See also cases collected in Sheridan & 
Delany, supra note 12, at 115, nn.1,3. 
39RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 400, cmt. b (1959). 
401 Ch. 243 (1923). 
41Id. at 246. 
42Id. 
43RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 400, cmt. c (1959).  Of course, in cases where the 
donor has provided for a gift over, the question of general charitable intent and, consequently, 
that of cy pres should not arise.   
441951 Ch. 373, 377. 
45Id. 
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If several persons contribute to a fund to be applied to a particular 
charitable purpose, and the purpose is fully accomplished without 
exhausting the trust property, and the doctrine of cy-pres is not applicable, 
a resulting trust of the surplus will arise in favour of the contributors who 
will be entitled to share it in proportion to their contribution.  If some of 
the contributors cannot be ascertained there will be a resulting trust of 
their shares to the State.46 
Thus, in the absence of a showing of a general charitable intent on subscription of 
fund, the cy pres doctrine would not apply and a resulting trust to either the 
subscriber or the state would follow.  The result should be the same in either case 
involving surplus:  1.  where the purpose has become impossible to achieve, and 2.  
where the purpose has been achieved and there is a surplus.47 
The British decision in In re Ulverston and District New Hospital Building 
Trust48 closely paralleled the rationale of the Restatement comment.  Funds were 
raised for a new hospital at Ulverston, but the enactment of the National Health 
Services Act of 1946 obviated the necessity for the hospital.  The court declared that 
the money should be returned to the original donors in a resulting trust.  For those 
donors who were unidentifiable, the court declared that they should be treated as 
bona vacantia, and the funds were passed to the Crown.49 
Aside from uneven statutory modifications, application of cy pres in the United 
States was summarized in 1959 as follows:50 
1. In cases of impossibility or surplus where there is a general charitable intent, 
there will be a cy-pres application by the court. 
2. In cases of impossibility or surplus, where there is no general charitable 
intent, there will be no cy-pres application.  A resulting trust ensues unless 
the gift was out-and-out when the property will go as on a failure of 
successors. 
3. Where there is a general charitable gift, with no object or insufficient details 
specified, the property will go as selected by the trustee appointed for the 
purpose or if necessary by the court. 
4. There is no executive power of cy-pres application. 
III.  THE OLD FACE OF REFORM:  IMPLEMENTING TESTATOR INTENT 
Development of the doctrine of cy pres in England proceeded both statutorily and 
judicially, beginning in the seventeenth century.51  In the United States, judicial 
development was slow, with codification beginning in the mid-twentieth century.  
American courts usually construed the doctrine strictly and narrowly, and by the 
                                                                
46RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 400 cmt. d (1959). 
47KEETON & SHERIDAN, supra note 7, at 150. 
481 W.L.R. 1260, 2 ALL E.R. 1032, 97 S.J. 728 (1953). 
49Contra, In re Gillingham Bus Disaster Fund (1958) Ch. 300 England; Charities Act, 
1960, § 14. The Charities Act of 1960 provided for a cy pres application in similar fact 
situations, rendering Ulverston obsolete.  
50SHERIDAN & DELANY, supra note 12, at 45. 
51See KEETON & SHERIDAN, supra note 7, at 135-36. 
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1950's, reformers called for supervision of charities and reform of the cy pres 
doctrine.52 
In England, supervisory power is conferred upon the Charity Commissioners or, 
in the case of educational endowments, upon the Ministry of Education, subject in 
both cases to appeal to the courts.53  The Charity Act of 1860 gave the Charity 
Commissioners power concurrent with the Chancery Division to establish or modify 
schemes within the limits of the cy pres doctrine.  The Endowed Schools Act of 1869 
removed power for educational trusts to an independent commission and these 
powers became part of the Board of Education in 1899 and are now vested in the 
Department of Education.54 
The Charities Act of 1960, passed in response to the Report of the Nathan 
Committee of 1952, was evaluated by the Woodfield Report of 1987.55  Although the 
Woodfield Report indicated that the cy pres doctrine might need to be "redefined in 
statute in a rather looser way, or relaxations introduced specifically for small 
charities,"56 the committee report recommended only that "[t]he Commission should 
consult widely on possible ways of relaxing the cy pres doctrine and advise the 
Home Secretary whether legislation would be desirable."57  Responding to this 
recommendation, the government determined that "legislation would not be 
appropriate," that it would in fact be "undesirable," and that the evolution of the 
traditional doctrine under existing law was preferable.58 
The Nathan Committee's proposals as they applied to the doctrine of cy pres also 
can be briefly summarized.  The Committee considered relaxation of the cy pres 
doctrine along two main lines:  a) relaxation of the need for impossibility and b) 
relaxation of the nearest rule, i.e. the rule that a cy pres  application must be to an 
object as near as possible to the one whose impracticable nature has given rise to the 
cy pres jurisdiction.59 
The Nathan Report, basically repeating the Reports of the Charity Commisioners 
who continually argued for greater cy pres application in their annual reports,60 
prompted legislation. The requirement for impossibility was relaxed in response to 
                                                                
52Supra note 4. 
53GEORGE W. KEETON, MODERN DEVELOPMENT IN THE LAW OF CHARITIES 303 (1971).  
54Id. at 304.  See SHERIDAN & DELANY, supra note 12, at 45. 
55For a more detailed discussion of the recommendations of the Woodfield Report, see 
Rob Atkinson, Reforming Cy Pres Reform, 44 Hast. L. J. 1111, 1156-57 n. 5 (1993).  See also 
Efficiency Scrutiny of the Supervision of Charities, Report to the Home Secretary and the 
Economic Secretary to the Treasury by Sir Philip Woodfield, KCB, CBE, Graham Binns, 
Richard Hirst and David Neal, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1987, § 83-85, 31-32. 
56See Woodfield Report § 85 at 32. 
57See Recommendation 27 at 32. 
58See Atkinson, supra note 55, at 1156 n. 5.  The Charities Act of 1992 made specific 
provisions for small charities, but left the doctrine relatively intact.  Also, section two of the 
Charities Act of 1985 provided specifically for local charities for poverty relief.  See 
Woodfield Report § 83. 
59KEETON & SHERIDAN, supra note 7, at 304. 
60Id. at 165-75. 
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the Report. Part III, section 13 of the Charity Act of 1960 reflects these changes by 
providing: 
a) Where the original purposes in whole or in part: 
i. have been as far as may be fulfilled; or 
ii. cannot be carried out, or not according to the directions given and to 
the spirit of the gift; or 
b) Where the original purposes provide a use for part only of the property 
available by virtue of the gift; or 
c) where the property available by virtue of the gift and other property 
applicable for similar purposes can be more effectively used in 
conjunction, and to that end can suitably, egard being had to the spirit of 
the gift, be made applicable  to common purposes; or 
d) where the original purposes were laid down by reference to  an area 
which then was but has since ceased to be a unit for some other purpose, 
or by reference to a class of persons or to an area which has for any 
reason since ceased to be suitable, regard being had to the spirit of the 
gift, or to be practical in administering the gift; or 
e) where the original purposes, in a whole or in part, have, since they were 
laid down: 
(i) been adequately provided for by other means; or 
(ii) ceased, as being useless or harmful to the community or for 
other reasons, to be in law charitable, or 
(iii) ceased in any other way to provide a suitable and effective 
method of using the property available by virtue of the gift, 
regard being had to the spirit of the gift.61 
The relaxation of the "nearest" rule is accomplished through section 13(d) of the 
Charities Act where the altered scheme is required to be within the spirit of the gift.  
Section 14 extended the application of cy pres to surplus gifts resulting from donees 
who are unknown or disclaiming. 
Professor Sheridan noted "there had been no relaxation of the requirement of 
impossibility in countries without legislation."62  The Charities Act of 1960 made it 
incumbent on the trustee to apply cy pres or to take steps to enable it to be so 
applied, under the relaxed rule in part III, section 13. 
If relaxation of the cy pres doctrine is, in fact, "the key to a more rational law of 
charities,"63 jurisdictions in the United States are still learning the lesson.  Judicially, 
a more liberal approach to the enforcement of charities is desirable; but, if the 
English trend is followed, relaxation will come by legislation.  The initial reluctance 
of the United States courts to accept the cy pres doctrine was being addressed by the 
1950's via statutory enactments.64  A growing awareness of the deficiencies in 
charitable trusts enforcement65 spearheaded legislative interest.  When the Nathan 
                                                                
61Id. at 271 (appendix I). 
62L. A. Sheridan, Cy-pres in the Sixties:  Judicial Activity, 6 Alberta Law Review 16, 20 
(1968). 
63KEETON, MODERN DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAW OF TRUSTS lst ed., 307. 
64See Bogert, supra, note 4 for a summary of the enactments. 
65Scott on Trusts, § 391; SHERIDAN AND DELANY, THE CY-PRES DOCTRINE 16-17, n. 88. 
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Report was published in 1952, George Gleason Bogert analyzed the report in his 
appeal for charity legislation and pointed out the reluctance in the states to legislate 
on public charities and to respond generally to the problems of public charities 
administration.  In 1968, Professor Sheridan, confirming the obvious, noted that the 
American courts were reluctant to apply the cy pres doctrine "where it ha[d] not been 
specifically introduced or confirmed by statute."66 
Two doctrines, the prerogative use of cy pres and the equitable approximation 
doctrine, have further confused the use of cy pres in the United States.  Courts 
initially had difficulty accepting the cy pres doctrine because of its association with 
the royal prerogative.67  The prerogative power is expressly denounced in United 
States as reflected in the Restatement: 
The prerogative power does not exist in the United  States; it cannot be 
exercised even by the legislature, although the legislature can enact 
general rules as to the extent and the exercise of the judicial power of the 
courts to apply cy pres to property which is given for charitable 
purposes.68 
Under the prerogative cy pres, the Crown directed the application of the fund to 
some charitable purpose when the original purpose failed.69  The arbitrary use of the 
doctrine and its association with the monarchy made even the use of judicial cy pres 
suspect. 
As an alternative to cy pres, American courts also applied, without clearly 
distinguishing between the two, the doctrine of equitable approximation.  The 
doctrine of equitable approximation is based on the rationale that the intent of the 
settlor in a private or charitable trust should be saved from frustration of purpose.  
When necessary to preserve the purpose, equity will allow a variation in the 
administration of the trust.  The case of Smith v. Moore,70 illustrates the confusion in 
the law of Virginia over adoption of cy pres and the United States Court of Appeals’ 
use of equitable approximation to “resolve” this confusion, while, at the same time, 
confusing equitable approximation with cy pres. 
The District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia applied cy pres to save a 
bequest made by a decedent who had died before the 1946 Virginia statute formally 
adopted the cy pres doctrine.71  On appeal, the heirs argued that cy pres was not a part 
of the law of Virginia before 1946.  They relied on Chief Justice John Marshall's 
opinion in Philadelphia Baptist Association v. Hart's Executors72 that cy pres was not 
                                                                
66Sheridan, supra note 25, at 16. 
67See SHERIDAN & DELANY, supra note 12, at 24; Sheridan, supra note 25, at 16-18 & 
n.88. 
68RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 399 cmt. h (1959). 
69The most egregious use of prerogative cy pres occurred in Da Costa v. De Pas, 27 Eng. 
Rep. 150 (Ch. 1754).  The trust created by a Jewish testator for religious instructions to those 
of the Jewish faith was applied cy pres by the Crown toward the support a Christian minister’s 
in giving instructions in the Christian faith.  The initial purpose was illegal. 
70225 F. Supp. 434 (E.D. Va. 1963), aff’d, 343 F.2d 594 (1965). 
71Moore, 225 F. Supp. at 434. 
7217 U.S.(4 Wheat)1 (1819). 
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an inherent power of the equity courts.  The Court of Appeals noted that:  “Virginia, 
having been one of the original states and thus having its laws enunciated under the 
influence of John Marshall, is in the mainstream of the confusion, contradiction and 
equivocation attaching to the history of the doctrine of cy pres in America.”73 
The appeals court refused to decide the issue of whether cy pres had been 
adopted in Virginia as part of the common law or only by the 1946 statute.  The 
court found "it unnecessary to decide because of the doctrine of equitable 
approximation"74 which allowed the court to substitute a hospital wing for a building, 
a clinic for a hospital and a hospital corporation as title holder instead of the trustee 
named by the decedent.  The court noted that the results which are obtained under 
the cy pres doctrine had been accomplished equally well by the application of 
equitable approximation.  Properly understood, however, the doctrine of equitable 
approximation, known also as administrative deviation, is not an alternative to cy 
pres.  Under administrative deviation, a court may vary the administrative directives 
of a trust when changed circumstances require.  Cy pres deals only with ultimate 
purpose, not with procedural efficiency.75 
IV.  THE NEWER FACE OF REFORM:  IMPLEMENTING PUBLIC POLICY 
Calls for reform of the cy pres doctrine in the years following 1943 have been 
both doctrinally and politically oriented.  The use of cy pres to reach private  
discriminatory gifts focused initially on discrimination against race and moved to 
other forms of discrimination including gender.  Thirty years have passed since 
Professor Stuart M. Nelkin of the University of Houston School of Law urged the 
use of "the Fourteenth amendment as a vehicle for 'social engineering' despite the 
absence of 'formal' state involvement."76  Professor Nelkin  advocated a bold use of 
the cy pres doctrine to insure that the government policy of non-discrimination 
announced in Brown v. Board of Education77 would move forward.  Discussing 
Shelley v. Kraemer78 and its precedential value to reach private acts of 
discrimination, Nelkin argued that there was an affirmative state duty to guarantee 
equal protection and concluded that the "artificial and ambiguous state action 
doctrine"79 should be discarded, along with "charitable trusts exclusively for one 
race."80  He applied, however, different considerations for "charitable trusts 
                                                                
73Moore, 343 F.2d at 599. 
74Id. at 600. 
75The confusion continues.  See Matter of the Estate of Wilson, 452 N.E.2d 1228 (1983), 
discussed infra.  For a more detailed discussion of the doctrines of cy pres and administrative 
deviation, see Chris Abbinante, Protecting "Donor Intent" in Charitable Foundations:  
Wayward Trusteeship and the Barnes Foundation, 145 U. Pa. L. Rev. 665 (1997). 
76See Stuart M. Nelkin, Cy Pres and the Fourteenth Amendment:  A Discriminating Look 
at Very Private Schools and Not So Charitable Trusts, 56 Geo. L. J. 272, 313 (1967).   
77347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
78334 U.S. 1 (1948). 
79Nelkin, supra note 76, at 272, 312. 
80Id. at 313. 
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exclusively for Negroes,"81 reasoning that such trusts should be upheld if the purpose 
was to "close the gap between whites and Negroes."82  Nelkin noted that "[i]deally, at 
some later date, all charities with racial overtones will be unenforceable."83 
Nelkin's article was followed a decade later by an article from Professor Elias 
Clark of Yale Law School,84  hailing the Supreme Court decision in  Pennsylvania v. 
Board of Directors85 as the "first step toward desegregation of charitable trusts."86  
The Supreme Court decided the case under the Fourteenth Amendment Equal 
Protection clause finding state action.  Clark, however, recognized the additional 
dimension that cy pres could bring to solve the problem of discriminatory trusts. 
The settlor is assumed to have been an intelligent and responsible citizen.  
Had he foreseen the future course of public policy, it is argued, he would 
not have intended his limitation to continue.  The reasoning has the virtue 
of accomplishing the public purpose within the framework of the settlor's 
intent.  Here, again, the traditions of judicial restraint often foreclose 
sensible solution.  If cy pres may properly be applied to a trust, the court 
will not hesitate to manufacture, in the settlor's name, a use for the funds 
more compatible with contemporary community values.87 
Clark realized that the requirement of a general charitable intent would have to be 
solved in each case, unless the lead of Pennsylvania could be followed.88  "It has 
been suggested that Pennsylvania, having recently enacted a statute which eliminates 
the requirement of general charitable intent, may now give greater consideration to 
the public welfare."89  Clark also recognized the problem of using the Fourteenth 
Amendment to solve "the delicate problems of discrimination."90 
Were the Ford Foundation to disperse its millions on a discriminatory 
basis, society would find the result intolerable.  On the other hand, a trust 
to educate poor children of a minority race seems useful and worthy of 
community approval.  Yet they are of the same stuff, and when the 
question is limited to the presence or absence of state action, they 
seemingly stand or fall together.91 
                                                                
81Id. 
82Id. at 314. 
83Id. 
84See Elias Clark, Charitable Trusts, The Fourteenth Amendment and the Will of Stephen 
Girard, 66 Yale L. J. 979 (1957). 
85353 U.S. 230 (1957). 
86Clark, supra note 84. 
87Id. at 1000. 
88Id.  
89Id. at 1000 & n. 81.  This has not happened. 
90Id. 
91Id. at 1009-10. 
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Clark stopped short of calling for social engineering, but he highlighted the 
context within which reformers would work.  They would have to strike a balance 
between the private right to control one's own property and the public right to 
charitable assets.92  Clark noted also that the "maliciously discriminatory trust is only 
of peripheral importance.  To the relatively few now in existence, the addition of 
many more is unlikely."93 
The Supreme Court rejected the arguments for affirmative social engineering in 
the 1970 case of Evans v. Abney.94  Justice Black, speaking for the majority, 
reasoned that "freedom of testation . . .  has its advantages and disadvantages."  
Freedom of testation dictated that Baconsfield, a park created with specific intent to 
discriminate, revert to the testator's heirs.  Black upheld the Georgia court's refusal to 
apply cy pres to integrate the park, noting that the Court would not "legislate social 
policy on the basis of . . . personal inclinations."95 
Justice Douglas's majority opinion in Evans v. Newton,96 finding that the park 
could no longer be operated as segregated because parks serve a public function, and 
the Black opinion in Abney, finding no state action in Georgia's use of the cy pres 
doctrine, defined the continuing debate about state involvement in discriminatory 
trusts.  The opinions also highlight the unpredictability associated with the state 
action concept and the entanglement and public functions exceptions by which 
individual discrimination can be reached.97  The dissents of Justices Black, Harlan, 
and Stewart in Newton and of Justices Douglas and Brennan in Abney add contours 
to the discourse which remains substantially unchanged.  Justice Black argued that 
state judicial action must affirmatively enforce "a private scheme of discrimination" 
to be proscribed by the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.98  
Justice Brennan found "state action in overwhelming abundance"99 and insisted that 
the facts supported a finding of significant state involvement which made 
enforcement of the reverter unconstitutional. 
Following the 1983 New York case, Matter of the Estate of Wilson,100 calls for 
reform again proliferated.  In Wilson, two cases with similar trust distribution 
                                                                
92Id. at 1014-15.  Clark also expressed the hope that after a period of time, the courts 
might not need to use cy pres to invalidate discriminatory trusts. 
93Id. at 980. 
94396 U.S. 435 (1970). 
95Id. at 447. 
96382 U.S. 296 (1966). 
97See Michael J. Klarman, An Interpretive History of Modern Equal Protection, 90 Mich. 
L. Rev. 213 (1991) for an analysis of the Supreme Court's application of the state action 
concept in a broader context.  See also Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law:  Principles 
and Policies 385-417 (1997). 
98396 U.S. at 445.  Black reasoned that Senator Bacon's private act of discrimination is not 
prohibited by the Fourteenth Amendment because it is not state action. 
99Id. at 455. 
100452 N.E.2d 1228 (N.Y. 1983). 
15Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1998
486 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:471 
provisions were consolidated.101  The New York Appeals Court reviewed the 
provisions which discriminated against women, and found that the exercise of cy 
pres was inappropriate.  The court used the mechanism of administrative deviation to 
save the trusts.102  Reasoning that the intent of both testators to benefit education103 of 
males should not be frustrated by the provisions which required state action to 
administer the funds, the court affirmed the appointment of private trustees to replace 
the public officials who were refusing to serve.104 
The court reasoned that the gender provisions were not illegal and refused to 
accept a per se rule that gender restrictions were contrary to public policy.  In doing 
so, the court announced that it accepted the concept, advanced by the "current 
thinking in private philanthropic institutions,"105 that charitable gifts should serve the 
needs of particular groups, and concluded that the "focusing of private philantropy 
on certain classes within society may be consistent with public policy."106  The New 
York court relaxed the impossibility requirement and elected to apply administrative 
deviation to save the trust purposes.  In announcing its opinion, the court recognized 
the value of a trust set up for gender purposes which would, in this case, benefit men, 
but which could, in other cases, benefit women. 
Current reformers who advocate weighing public policy heavily against the 
testator's intent perceive the court's policy-making function as primary, urging 
judicial activism to further public policy agenda.107  In a 1989 article, Mark Petrucci 
argued that courts should "rethink their cy pres approach and start to give more 
weight to the public policy issues involved."108  Petrucci advanced an "if then" test.  
Treating testator intent and public policy as "co-equals," the court should search for a 
general charitable intent.  If one is found, the court should remove the discriminatory 
provisions of the trust.  If one is not found, the court should "allow the trust to be 
destroyed."109 
The Petrucci proposal differs from the charitable trust anti-discrimination statute 
proposed by Steven Swanson.110  Swanson's proposal is based on the Race Relations 
                                                                
101Id. at 1228.  In the Matter of Wilson, the testator's trust provided first year college 
expenses to five young men whose names were to be certified by the Superintendent of 
Schools.  Id. at 1231.  In the Matter of Johnson, the Board of Education and the high school 
Principal were charged with selecting deserving male students to receive educational benefits 
under the Johnson trust.  Id. 
10259 N.E.2d 461, 474-75. 
103Id. at 472. 
104Id. at 480. 
105Id., at 473-74. 
106Id., at 474.   
107See Mark Petrucci, The Cy Pres Doctrine - Is It State Action?, 18 Cap. U. L. Rev. 383 
(1989). 
108Id. at 411. 
109Id. 
110Steven R. Swanson, Discriminatory Charitable Trusts:  Time for a Legislative Solution, 
48 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 153 (1986). 
16https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol46/iss3/5
1998] CY PRES DOCTRINE IN THE UNITED STATES 487 
Act [of] 1976 passed by the United Kingdom.111  Swanson’s statute forbids 
discrimination, except in situations where the discriminatory provisions would 
remedy past discrimination.112 
Petrucci criticized Swanson’s proposal as an affirmative action statute, "This is 
not an area where affirmative action will work.  To allow someone to set up a 
discriminatory trust (one wrong) to redress a past discrimination (another wrong) is 
not logical."113 
Many of the current calls for cy pres reform appear in the guise of "charitable 
efficiency" arguments.114  Decrying the vise in which reformers currently find 
themselves, pressed on one side by "deference to dead hand control" and on the other 
by "undefined standards of charitable efficiency,"115  Professor Rob Atkinson, 
relying on the Woodfield Report's suggestion for small charities,116 called for giving 
trustees virtually unlimited power to manage assets in the way they decide "would 
most advance the public good."117  Under his plan, the trustee would be limited only 
by "what the state defines as charitable through common law, legislation, or 
administrative regulation, as well as by extralegal mechanisms to enforce donor 
intent."118  Atkinson proposed the "sectarian approach" as an attempt to steer between 
the "liberal individualism underlying 'pure' cy pres" and the "communitarianism 
underlying" efforts concentrating on the public good.119  Atkinson, by transferring 
discretion from the courts and granting extensive decision-making to the trustee, 
substantially reduced recourse to the courts and created a wide area for possible 
abuse, as well as virtual negation of donor intent. 
                                                                
111See the statute which inspired Swanson's proposal.  Id. at 188. 
112Id. at 190-91. 
113Petrucci, supra note 107, at 409. 
114See Roger G. Sisson, Relaxing the Dead Hand's Grip:  Charitable Efficiency and the 
Doctrine of Cy Pres, 74 Va. L. Rev. 635 (1988), responding to the California decision in In re 
Estate of Beryl H. Buck, No. 23259 (Cal. Super. Ct. Aug. 15, 1986).  See also John G. Simon, 
American Philanthropy and the Buck Trust, 21 U.S.F. L. Rev. 641 (1987).  Calls for reform of 
the doctrine are usually sparked by a case in which application of the doctrine is criticized.  
For a convincing argument favoring donor intent and criticizing the efficiency arguments 
surrounding In re Barnes, see Chris Abbinante, Protecting "Donor Intent" in Charitable 
Foundations:  Wayward Trusteeship and the Barnes Foundation, 145 U. Pa. L. Rev. 665 
(1997).  Abbinante argues that "an additional legal hurdle should be erected to protect donor 
intent . . . a rebuttable presumption against permitting any type of deviation from the intent of 
the donor, administrative or purposive, which can be overcome only when the trustee makes a 
showing of indisputable need."  Id. at 705. 
115See Rob Atkinson, Reforming Cy Pres Reform. 44 Hastings L. J. 1111, 1142 (1993). 
116Id. at 1156, n.5.  Atkinson acknowledged this suggestion as the basis for his broader 
proposals for reform.  
117Id. at 1143. 
118Id. 
119Id. at 1144-45. 
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By 1998, Atkinson, admitting that it was not "entirely wise,"120 no longer 
advanced the model as a "universal and mandatory alternative to . . . dead-hand 
control . . . and its corollary, the cy pres doctrine."121  Atkinson recognized that a 
donor creates "an explicitly sectarian organization" when he gives unlimited 
discretion to trustees to apply funds when purposes fail.  He now argues for a 
"flexible presumption . . . in favor of fiduciary discretion."122  The presumption is 
applicable only "to particular kinds of charity" and can be rebutted "only by the 
donor's explicit contrary reservation."123  Atkinson reasoned that this "flexible 
presumption of donor intent would function much like a liberalized cy pres rule."124 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The various calls for cy pres reform in the United States inevitably favor either 
donor intent or public policy.  Courts must engage in a balancing test when 
reviewing a trust which discriminates, understanding the reality that discrimination, 
either benign or invidious, is inherent in charitable giving.  Invidious discrimination 
involving state action is, of course, illegal, and will not be allowed.  Under the cy 
pres doctrine, however, the question in each case where the trust purpose has failed 
and a general charitable intent has been established becomes whether the trust fund 
will be applied to the next nearest purpose or whether the trust itself will fail.  
Traditionally, the courts in the United States have decided in favor of donor intent, 
even when to do so has resulted in trust forfeiture.  If this practice continues, and 
history indicates that it will, the Massachusetts model, respecting tradition but 
recognizing the need for reform, presents a workable answer to the problem of 
discriminatory trusts.  The statute creates a presumption of general charitable intent 
which can be rebutted by a writing memorializing the donor's particular intent.125  
Astute drafting should allow the donor purposefully to retain or relinquish control 
over the funds, and thus to guide the courts in application of the cy pres doctrine.  
Should he elect to create the "sectarian organization" encouraged by Professor 
Atkinson, the donor will inadvertently participate in the progressive development of 
the cy pres doctrine. 
 
                                                                
120Rob Atkinson, Unsettled Standing:  Who (Else) Should Enforce the Duties of 
Charitable Fiduciaries? 23 J. Corp. L. 655, 687 (1998). 
121Id. 
122Id. at 691. 
123Id. 
124Id. at 692. 
125Supra, note 24.  Although Professor Ronald Chester called for the abandonment of the 
general intent requirement in Massachusetts and argued for extended use of cy pres before gift 
over provisions and residuary clauses control, the Massachusett courts have not abandoned the 
traditional requirement.  See Ronald Chester, Cy Pres or Gift Over:  The Search for 
Coherence in Judicial Reform of Failed Charitable Trusts, 23 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 41 (1989).    
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